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Politique Migratoire Optimale, migration re-
tour: Re`gles versus Discre´tion
Re´sume´
Cet article analyse les effets d’une politique souple de fermeture des frontie`res
sur la migration retour. Nos re´sultats montrent que les migrants sont plus
incite´s a` retourner dans leur pays d’origine lorsque les politiques migra-
toires sont souples, leur garantissant ainsi la possibilite´ de re-e´migrer en
cas de chocs adverses dans le pays d’origine. Jusqu’alors me´connu, les poli-
tiques migratoires moins restrictives re´duisent les flux nets de migrants.
Aussi, la politique migratoire optimale de´finie par un gouvernement sous
une politique de re`gle est plus souple qu’elle le serait si le meˆme gou-
vernement adoptait une politique discre´tionnaire. Par ailleurs, des pays
d’origine plus stables sont profitables a` la fois aux pays de destination par
un faible de stock de migrants et aux migrants par une forte productivite´
du travail dans leur pays d’origine.
Mots cle´s: Migration Retour; Politique Migratoire Optimale; Incohe´rence
temporelle
JEL Classification: E61; F220; J150
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1 Introduction
Immigration is one of the critical emergencies of our time, particularly in West-
ern Europe but also, albeit in different ways, in the United States and other
high-income countries, and it seems to make a clear divide between those who
prefer the term “put a brake on it” and those who emphasize the duty to “re-
ceive”. However, the feeling that seems to prevail in many States is the former,
as is shown by the increase in the elections of parties whose ideological plat-
form is based primarily on promises of greater control of the borders and a
no-quarter onslaught on clandestine immigration. Faced with the threat of an
erosion of the electoral consensus, and in order to remove the monopoly of this
issue from emerging forces, openly xenophobic and that feed on social disquiet,
certain more traditional parties, which until a short time ago did not appear to
harbour deep-seated prejudices on the subject, have also begun to make some of
their own anti-immigration speeches and make promises concerning its control
and its restriction.
In this paper, we study the effects of more open borders on return migration:
migrants who consider returning home but are reluctant to give up their cur-
rent status in the host country are more likely to return to their origin country
if afterwards they think it is still possible to re-migrate to the host country.
As a result, softening migration rules leads to lower net inflows than gener-
ally acknowledged. Nevertheless, in this framework the problem of dynamic
incoherence is easily set out (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon,
1983): the government may in fact face the incentive, once a relatively permis-
sive policy is announced (that will push many immigrants to go back home), in
later putting into effect a far more restrictive one and drastically rationing the
number of the re-immigrants.
We show that the optimal migration policy implemented following rules is
more permissive than that put into effect should the government adopt a dis-
cretionary behavior. In absence of a commitment technology, our model predict
an equilibrium outcome corresponding to rather restrictive migration policies.
This seems to be at odds with observed migration flows which, in view of their
importance, emphasize that most part of the countries implement softer poli-
cies. This suggests the existence of some commitment technology allowing to
reach the first best equilibrium. We propose a solution of the time inconsistency
problem based upon electoral accountability.
Several database that provide a comprehensive overview of migration report
that the number of international migrants substantially increased since 1960. In
2013, the number of international migrants reached 232 million and this number
represents an increase of 33% compared to 2000. Migrations policies, tools for
many receiving countries to determine how many people to admit account for
much. To assess how migration policies evolve over time and its changes across
countries is severely hampered by data availability. However, efforts are made
to collect government views and responses to migrations. In a survey covering
195 countries, policy makers are invited to express if they perceive migration
policies in their country high, suitable or rather low. Once keeping in mind
3
that the data must be interpreted with caution, it appears that in 2007, barely
80% governments are satisfied with the current immigration levels. Less than
20% view them unduly high while 5% find them very low. It follows that actual
policies is less restrictive than would be called for. Moreover, Ortega and Peri
(2013) reach the similar result by constructing immigration laws database for the
main OECD countries. They construct an index to assess whether migrations
policies are enough restrictive or not. They find considerable periods during
which laws for entry are low. This was the case in the US between 1980 and 1990,
Canada and Germany since 1990 or Sweden since the mid 1990s. While periods
of too restrictive migration policy can be identified ( for example Danmark in
the 2000), there are more countries that conduct mild migration policies than
countries that severely restrict them. While several reasons are put forward to
explain this figure 1 we argue that electoral accountability account for much.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the government goal is to minimize
the stock of migrants settled in the country taking into account the cost of border
control. Such a goal reflects a postulated feeling of hostility toward migration
among the natives. Such widespread feeling is the result of the uncontrollable
dimensions it has assumed in recent years, in itself the result of various histori-
cal events of the time such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab Spring
and the proliferation of regional armed conflicts in Africa and Asia which have
released an explosive potential of economic and political refugees. In Europe,
especially, the Schengen Treaty has led to an unprecedented circulatory flow
within those nations that adhere to it, and in particular it has permitted a
massive exodus of citizens from the countries of Eastern Europe towards the
economically more prosperous States (Lundborg and Segerstrom, 2002; Doc-
quier et al., 2014). These hostile feelings towards the migration phenomenon
have hardened since the recession of 2008 and the changed nature of immigra-
tion itself: if at first it was for the most part seasonal and temporary, but from
the 70’s on it was characterized by families reuniting and settling permanently
(Castles, 2006). This explain why in many western countries a substantial
number of citizens exerted upon their governments, under threat of electoral
sanctions, considerable pressure in order that policies be adopted to contain
the entry flow and at the same time ensure the rapid exit of those immigrants
already settled in the country. Card et al. (2012) emphasize how European
opinions about migrants reflect more cultural points of views rather than mere
cost-benefit perceptions and Belot and Ederveen (2012) as well as Bertoli et al.
(2013) analyze the huge resistance, not merely economical but also cultural, in
developed countries to migration.
Controlling the entry flow depends on policies aimed at rendering access to
the national territory more difficult, and are the more burdensome the more
impassable one wants to make the borders. The policies that aim at increasing
the exit flow can take on the semblance of coercive deportation, as for exam-
ple the penalties predicted in Italy following the introduction of “the crime of
clandestinity”(only recently abolished), or specific legislative dispositions such
1See
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as the worsening of the conditions governing the renewal of residence permits
and the granting of work permits that limit the duration of residence abroad
(OECD, 1999, 2001, 2013; Boeri and Brucker, 2005; Khraiche, 2014). But one
can also influence the choices of the immigrants themselves, for example by way
of arranging tempting financial incentives that will induce them to return home
voluntarily (OECD, 2009).
The perception of migration as a temporary phenomenon has produced a
relatively recent literature. Dustmann (1997, 2003) proposes to establish the
optimal length of the migration period on the hypothesis that there exist com-
plementarities between consumption and the location where consumption takes
place, and shows that this length is reduced when the consumption is most val-
ued at home and/or the accumulation of wealth in the host country occurs at a
faster rate. Such hypotheses are tested by Dustmann and Weiss (2007) in the
context of the United Kingdom. In a more recent paper, Dustmann et al. (2011)
deepen the analysis by accounting for the role of human capital accumulation
and the related brain drain phenomenon on the return migration choice. On
the basis of the insights of Kossoudji (1992) and Faini (1996), Magris and Russo
(2009) show how a more permissive migration policy reduces the average length
of each period spent in the country of immigration, presuming that the indi-
viduals emigrate repeatedly in the course of their lives. Bazillier et al. (2015)
observe how the economic fluctuations of a short period produce, in terms of exit
flows, the same effects as restrictive policies in recessionary periods. Borjas and
Bratberg (1996) and Dustmann and Gorlach (2014) ascertain how return mi-
gration is rather “selective” and more easily to be found among the immigrants
coming from high-income countries rather than those still developing. Fan and
Wang (2006) and de Haas et al. (2014) interpret return migration as the sign
of a success or a failure of the migrant in the hosting country. Domingues Dos
Santos and Wolff (2010) interested to know why Portuguese migrants are more
likely to return home show that the explanation also has to do with the family
ties with their country. Indeed, 40% of Portuguese in France have at least one
parent living in Portugal compared to 23% for Italian and Spanish migrants.
The total stock of immigrants settled in a country at a particular period is
made up of the difference of entry flows and the exit ones and apparently only the
first flow is susceptible to the policies of border closure. In this article we propose
to analyze the impact of such policies on the second flow too. The decision to
emigrate often represents a reaction to an adverse shock which involves the origin
country and which may consist of an environmental catastrophe, a famine, a war,
a coup d’e´tat, a decline in the course of goods destined for export or a rise in the
course of those imported. Common to each of such contingencies is the drop in
earnings following the drop in productivity. The presence of productivity shocks
are emphasized in Coulombe (2006) when he analyzes interprovincial migration
in Canada and shows that it is principally driven by structural factors such
as the long-run regional differential in unemployment rates, the rural/urban
differential structure of the provinces and, as it is our case, labor productivity.
However, if consumption is more valorized in the country of provenance
to the extent of compensating for possible differences in terms of productiv-
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ity between the two countries (should the adverse shock not be realized), an
immigrant will carefully weigh up the advisability of returning to his country
on the basis of the expected advantage represented by such a choice. Such
advantage is obviously correlated positively with the preference for domestic
consumption, with the stability of the country of provenance and, above all,
with the probability of the reinstatement of his condition as migrant in case of
an unsuccessful migration return i.e. if, once returned home, he observes the
realization of the negative shock (which we suppose to be distributed indepen-
dently). More open borders represent, in some sense, an insurance coverage
against the typical instability of the source countries usually low-income with
weak and unstable politico-economic structures, exposed to environmental risks,
and frequently shaken by the tremors of war. Thus a more permissive migration
policy will ensure a greater exit flow from the country which will counterbal-
ance, at least in part, the greater entry flow. Therefore, softening migration
rules leads to lower net inflows than generally acknowledged and as a conse-
quence, the optimal migration policy is likely to be more permissive than that
implemented when only the exit flows are taken into account. The commitment
problem is easily comprehensible once one observes that after having announced
a strategical permissive policy to encourage migrants to return home, the gov-
ernment acting under discretion could be tempted to change idea. In response
to an adverse shock in the source country, the government would in fact face a
strong migratory pressure (composed by those immigrants settled at the begin-
ning of the period in the source country and by those who voluntarily moved
back to it). This would in turn require to strengthen the policy in order to
limit the total number of entries. If, on the other hand, the government follows
rules, it will implement a moderately permissive policy in order to avoid a too
much large migratory flow that would make it necessary to reshape its policy
in more restrictive terms. Let us observe that the first best outcome attained
under rules cannot be implemented in a repeated game since the composition
of the immigrants in the two countries is not time-invariant. The unique way
to implement the “rules” equilibrium requires therefore the availability of an
appropriate commitment technology.
Since closing the border is costly, it follows that the policy implemented fol-
lowing rules Pareto dominates the discretionary one from the point of view of
the destination country: in the case of an adverse shock in the origin country,
the lower stock of immigrants implied by the latter will be more than com-
pensated by the larger implementation cost. Of course, under both policies,
the optimal state dependent migration policy entails a complete degree of fron-
tiers’ openness contingent to the realization of the good shock, since all the
migrants that decided to go back home, will remain there until the end of the
period. Eventually, a more stable origin country implies a Pareto improvement
for both natives and immigrants. The former will expect a lower stock of immi-
grants, meanwhile the latter will face a larger average labor productivity in the
source country. This suggests the opportunity of policies aimed at stabilizing
the source countries by means of specific financing programs and the institution
of economic partnerships with the developed countries.
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2 The Model
In this Section we introduce the model and present the main results. We first
describe the migrants’ behavior and the choices they are faced with, with par-
ticular regard to the possibility of a return to the origin country. We analyze the
conditions under which such a choice would be effectuated. Then we present the
government goal consisting in minimizing of the total stock of migrants settled
in the destination country at the end of period, taking into account the imple-
mentation costs of the migration policies. Under such hypotheses, we derive
the optimal migration policies when the government follows rules and when its
behavior is discretionary. Finally, we compare the outcome in these two cases
and we appraise the stochastic dynamics of the number of migrants settled in
the destination country over time.
2.1 Migrants
We consider a one-period, two-country economy composed of a destination coun-
try D and of an origin country O. At the beginning of the period there is a stock
M of migrants settled in the destination country D and a stock N of potential
migrants settled in country O. Each migrant located initially in O must de-
cide whether to migrate to the destination country D and each migrant settled
at the beginning of the period in D faces the choice whether or not to move
back to O. In both countries, each migrant has access to a linear production
function in labor and whose supply, to keep things as simple as possible, is as-
sumed to be inelastic and normalized to one. However, the two countries differ
in terms of labor productivity. In country D, the corresponding productivity is
kD, and therefore the single consumption good can be produced according to
the technological relationship
cD = kD.
The utility function is assumed to be linear in consumption, which means that
individuals are risk-neutral 2
u (cD) = cD = kD.
On the other hand, if a migrant decides to remain in O (either because he was
settled there at the beginning of the period and does not want, or is not able, to
migrate to D, or because he is settled in D and, after having decided to move
back to O, he does not want or is unable to re-migrate to D), he or she will
face a stochastic labor productivity which will take the value of kHO with the
probability q ∈ [0, 1] and the value of kLO with the probability 1 − q (where H
and L stand, respectively, for “high” and “low”), with
kHO > k
L
O. (1)
2We assume risk neutrality for sake of simplicity. By assuming more general utility func-
tions, results would not change from a qualitative point of view. Only, it would be come
impossible to derive explicitly the critical parameters of the model
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The parameter q captures the relative instability of country O to D. A q very
close to one reflects a rather stable origin country in which productivity is very
likely to be high, whereas a q close enough to zero denotes an origin country
where the labor productivity is very likely to be low. In country O, there
is a preference for domestic consumption reflected by the parameter α ≥ 0
measuring the marginal utility of consumption. As a matter of fact, the utility
function in O of a migrant with a preference for domestic consumption α is
u (cO) = αcO = αk
i
O, i = H,L.
If α is larger than one, an individual prefers to consume in O a given amount of
the consumption good; if, on the other hand, α < 1, consumption in D yields
more utility relatively to O. At the beginning of the period, a migrant settled
in O observes the realization of the shock and then decides whether or not to
migrate to D. We assume that if the good state of the nature is realized, he will
choose to remain in O, i.e. we make the hypothesis that αkHO > kD, implying
α > kD/k
H
O ≡ αmin. (2)
On the other hand, if the adverse shock occurs, we assume that the migrant will
immediately try to migrate to D. This means αkLO < kD, i.e.
α < kD/k
L
O ≡ αmax. (3)
Finally, we assume that the stock M of migrants settled in D and the total
number N of the candidate migrants settled at the beginning of the period in O
are distributed according, respectively, to the density functions f (α) and g (α)
with M =
αmax∫
αmin
f (α) dα and N =
αmax∫
αmin
g (α) dα.
2.2 Return Migration
Suppose that migrants settled in D must decide whether or not to move back
to O at the beginning of the period. However, they must take a decision before
they know the realization of the shock, since the state of nature in O can be
observed only when an individual is already settled there. If they decide to
return to O, once they reach such a country, they wait for the realization of the
shock. However, before choosing whether or not to move back to O, they face
a state dependent probability vector (peH , p
e
L), announced by the government,
and which corresponds to the probabilities a candidate migrant faces to succeed
in re-migrating to D as a function of the realization of each state of the nature.
The state dependent migration policy can be viewed as an entry requirement
contingent upon some specific requisite, as it is the case when granting the status
of political refugee is conditional to some specific characteristic of the country
of provenance. We define a migration policy as a vector (pH , pL) representing
the effective probabilities of migrating to D as a function of the realization of
each state of nature, given the announced policy (peH , p
e
L). The expected utility
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ue for an individual with a preference for domestic consumption α, however,
depends upon the announced migration policy (peH , p
e
L), and is given by
ue = αqkHO + p
e
L (1− q) kD + α (1− q) (1− peL) kLO. (4)
Equation (4) has the following meaning. If a migrant settled in D moves to O,
with a probability q he faces a labor productivity kHO (which yields an utility
αkH0 ) and, in view of (2), remains in O. Conversely, with a probability (1− q),
he faces a labor productivity kLO (which yields a utility αkL) and, in view of (3),
he tries to re-migrate to D. If he succeeds (with an expected probability peL), he
will enjoy the productivity kD; if not (with an expected probability 1− peL) the
productivity will be kLO entailing an utility αkL. It follows that the migrant will
decide to return to O at the beginning of the period if and only if the associated
expected utility (4) is larger than the utility guaranteed by remaining in D,
namely if and only if ue > kD. From (4), under condition (2), it is immediately
verifiable that for peL = 1, the individual settled in D will always choose to move
from D to O since, in such a case, (4) boils down to αqkHO + (1− q) kD which,
under inequality (2), is larger than kD for all q. Such a feature is in particular
true when the government of D grants the nationality to the migrant. Since ue is
increasing in α, by solving for α the indifference condition ue = kD, one obtains
the critical preference αM for domestic consumption such that for α > αM
individuals settled in D will decide to move back to O. As a matter of fact, this
will be true when α satisfies
α > αM ≡ [1− (1− q) p
e
L] kD
qkHO + (1− q) (1− peL) kLO
. (5)
It is immediately verifiable that αM is decreasing in q since it moves from
αmax (when q = 0) to αmin (when q = 1): indeed, the larger the probability
q of the occurrence of the good state of nature, the lower the preference for
consumption in O needed to provide the incentive to agents to return to O. It
is also immediately verifiable that the larger the labor productivity kD in D,
the larger α must be in order to push migrants to leave D. Thirdly, the larger
the labor productiveness kHO and k
L
O in O, the lower the critical preference
for the domestic consumption αM needed to make a return to O profitable in
expected terms. Finally, αM is decreasing in p
e, since the expected probability
of a successful re-migration to O can be viewed as a kind of insurance against
the realization of the adverse shock. As a matter of fact, we have the following
useful expression:
dαM
dpeL
= − q (1− q) kD
(
kHO − kLO
)[
qkHO + (1− q) (1− peL) kLO
]2 < 0. (6)
with
d2αM
dpe2L
=
−2 [qkHO + (1− q) (1− p) kLO] (1− q) kLOq (1− q) kD (kHO − kLO)[
qkHO + (1− q) (1− peL) kLO
]4 < 0.
(7)
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2.3 Optimal Policy with Migration Return
We assume that the unique role for the government is to regulate both the
exit and the entry migratory flows and to try to minimize the total number of
migrants settled in D at the end of the period. This is done in view of a postu-
lated aversion toward immigration characterizing natives’ preferences that the
benevolent government is willing to satisfy (for example, in order to ensure its re-
election in the future). As a matter of fact, the government must choose the op-
timal degree of frontier openness consisting in a vector (pH , pL) ∈ ([0, 1] ∗ [0, 1])
representing the migration policies effectively implemented in correspondence
to each state of the nature, taking into account the announced state contin-
gent policy (peH , p
e
L) ∈ ([0, 1] ∗ [0, 1]). Notice that we assume that government
is interested only in minimizing the total number of the migrants in the period
under study and therefore ignores the impact of its choice on the stock of mi-
grants settled in D in all future periods. However, the implementation of such a
policy is costly: i.e. the more permissive the migration policy, the less expensive
its implementation; in particular, a complete closure of the frontier entails an
infinite cost. A reliable shape for the cost function is the following:
C (pi) = p
−1
i − pii = H,L. (8)
It is immediately verifiable that C (0) = +∞, C (1) = 0, C ′ (pi) = −p−2i − 1 <
0 with C ′ (0) = −∞ and C ′ (1) = −2. At the beginning of the period the
government announces a state dependent migration policy (peH , p
e
L) establishing
the probability candidate migrants face of moving successfully from O to D in
each state of the nature. In response to the announced policy, migrants settled
in D decide whether or not to return to O, before they know the realization
of the shock. On the other hand, migrants settled in O observe the shock and
react consequently either by trying to migrate to D (in the case the adverse
shock should realize) or by deciding to remain in O (if the good shock occurs).
When shaping the optimal migration policy, the government can follow either
rules or adopt a discretionary behavior. For a given anticipated policy (peH , p
e
L)
and an implemented policy (pH , pL) the expected loss function is
q
 αM (p
e
L)∫
αmin
f (α) dα
+
(1− q)
pLN +
αM (p
e
L)∫
αmin
f (α) dα+ pL
αmax∫
αM(peL)
f (α) dα
+ (9)
q
(
p−1H − pH
)
+ (1− q) (p−1L − pL) .
Actually, (9) has the following interpretation. First, recall to mind that migrants
settled in D at the beginning of the period will decide whether or not to move
to O on the basis of the expected announced policy (peH , p
e
L). If the good state
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of nature is realized (with a probability q), all migrants settled in D at the
beginning of the period and who decided to move back to O will remain there
and, at the same time, no migrant initially settled in O will leave the country.
On the other hand, if the adverse shock is realized (with a probability 1 − q),
all migrants settled in D and who decided to move back to O will attempt to
re-migrate to D; nevertheless, only a share pL of them will succeed. At the
same time, all the migrants settled initially in O will try to migrate to D but
only a share pL of them will reach such a goal. Setting F (α) the repartition
function of f(α) and after straightforward rearrangements, expression (9) can
be rewritten as
F (αM (p
e
L)) [1− (1− q) pL]− F (αmin) +
(1− q) (N + F (αmax)) pL + (10)
q
(
p−1H − pH
)
+ (1− q) (p−1L − pL) .
Notice that the loss function (10), provided pL ≤ pH (we will see in the sequel
that such an inequality is satisfied), is decreasing in the probability q of the
realization of the good shock as one can easily verify by a direct inspection of
(10). This suggests that a more stable source country is beneficial for every-
body: for the natives of country D in view of the reduced expected loss and for
the immigrants because of the higher expected labor productivity in the origin
country.
2.4 Optimal Policy under Rules
If government is constrained to follow rules, the policy implemented must be
equal to the announced one, i.e. (pH , pL) = (p
e
H , p
e
L). To this end, notice that
(10) is decreasing in pH and therefore its optimal value is pH = 1. In addi-
tion, (10) is positive for all pL ∈ [0, 1]; namely, it is +∞ when pL = 0 and
reaches a positive and finite value when pL = 1. It follows that it possesses
a minimum, which may be either interior to the interval [0, 1] or may corre-
spond to the corner solution pL = 1. To characterize such a minimum, let us
write the derivative of (10) with respect to pL equalized to zero which, after
straightforward rearrangements, can be written as
(1− q) (N + F (αmax)− F (αM )) + F ′ (αM )α′M [1− (1− q) pL] =
(1− q) (p−2L + 1) (11)
Notice that the left-hand side of (11) is continuos in pL ∈ [0, 1] and that it
will be positive as well as negative, according to the magnitude of α′M . If
the latter is close enough to zero, the derivative is positive and the solution
for pL is will be very likely to belong to (0, 1): this is particularly true when
N + F (αmax) − F (αM ) > 2. If, on the other hand, |α′M | is large enough, the
left-hand side of (11) will be negative; it follows that the number of migrants
settled in D at the end of the period will decrease in response to an increase
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of pL and the solution may be pL = 1. The intuition is straightforward: if the
number of the migrants settled in D and deciding to move back to O increases
sharply in response to an increase of pL, the total number of migrants who
will try to re-migrate to D in reaction to an adverse shock will be large, and
therefore a more restrictive migration policy would be needed to mitigate the
entries. The opposite feature is observed when α′M is close enough to zero; the
number of migrants who moved back to O and who try to go back to D will be
lower and therefore the migration policy would need not be very restrictive.
One may wonder, at this point, what is the effect of an increase of the
probability q of the realization of the good shock on the optimal choice for
pL. Here the answer is ambiguous since it depends again upon the behavior of
F ′ (αM ) and of α′M . If these functions are relatively stable, the left-hand side of
(11) will undergo, in reaction to an increase of q, an upward shift (since F (αM )
is decreasing in q) and therefore will cross the function p−2L +1 in correspondence
to a lower pL and the optimal policy will then be more restrictive. On the other
hand, when F ′ (αM ) and α′M are rather elastic (and maybe F
′′
(αM ) < 0), the
optimal policy can turn out to be more permissive. In any case, the total stock
of migrants settled in the destination country at the end of the period, will be
lower since immigrants will face a stronger incentive to move back to O and it
will be very likely that they will remain there.
2.5 Optimal Policy under Discretion
Suppose now that the government adopts a discretionary conduct and agents
expect a migration policy (peH , p
e
L). When the good state of nature is realized,
no migrant settled initially in O will try to migrate and all those who left D and
moved back to O will remain there. Should the adverse shock be realized, all
those individuals who are initially in O together with those who moved back to
O from D will try to migrate (or re-migrate) to D. However, once the migrants
have taken a decision concerning in which country to settle in, the government
re-minimizes the loss function (10) with respect to pH and pL. It is immediately
verifiable that the optimal deviation, in the case the good state of the nature
realizes, is pH = 1 which represents also the time consistent equilibrium, since
in such a case no migrant in O will try to migrate to D. On the other hand,
when the adverse shock occurs, the government ri-minimizes its loss function
(10) with respect to pL, setting pH equal to one. It is immediately verifiable
that in such a case (10) is infinite for pL = 0 and finite and positive for pL = 1.
Therefore its derivative vanishes almost once in [0, 1], and the optimal pL will
be either one or a value included in (0, 1) . As a matter of fact, the derivative of
(10) with respect to pL equalized to zero (setting pH = 1) gives
N + [F (αmax)− F (αM (peL))] = p−2L + 1 (12)
i.e.
pdevL = (N + [F (αmax)− F (αM (peL))]− 1)−1/2 (13)
where dev stands for “deviation” representing the government’s best response to
the announced policy. Notice that when N + [F (αmax)− F (αM (0))] > 2, pdevL
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is always interior to the interval [0, 1] and, in the opposite case, it can be equal
to one. Since agents are endowed with rational expectations, they anticipate
correctly the government’s best response and then one has pdevL = p
e
L = pL. It
follows that the time consistent migration policy is
pL = (N + [F (αmax)− F (αM (pL))]− 1)−1/2 . (14)
The right-hand side of (14), as it is easily verifiable, is continuous, decreasing
and bounded in pL. It follows that it will cross the curve pL at most once. If it
were not the case, the discretionary equilibrium would be pL = 1. By inspecting
(14), one can easily verify that, since αM is decreasing in q and F
′ (αM ) > 0,
in response to an increase in q, the right-hand side of (14) will shift downward
and will cross the line pL in correspondence to a point closer to zero. The
new optimal migration policy will become therefore more restrictive and will
entail, of course, a larger implementation cost. However this higher cost is more
than counterbalanced by the decrease of αM and therefore by the lower stock
of migrants settled in D at the end of the period. Notice, finally, that the best
response function (14) is discontinuous in q = 1 as it is possible to verify by a
direct inspection of (10). In such a case, the optimal deviation will be pL = 1.
2.6 Comparing the Two Regimes
We have seen that both in the “rules” as well as in the “discretionary” regime,
the optimal migration policy contingent to the realization of the good shock is
equal to one. We have in addition proved that under rules the optimal policy
pL contingent to the occurrence of the adverse shock solves (11), namely
(N + F (αmax)− F (αM )) + F
′ (αM )α′M [1− (1− q) pL]
(1− q) = p
−2
L + 1 (15)
and under discretion it solves (12) once one has replaced peL with pL, i.e.
N + F (αmax)− F (αM ) = p−2L + 1 (16)
Comparing the left-hand sides of (15) and (16), we easily see that the former is
lower than the latter for all pL included in [0, 1], since their difference is given
by
F ′ (αM )α′M [1− (1− q) pL]
(1− q) < 0. (17)
It follows that under discretion, the policy migration will be more restrictive,
since the left-hand side of (15) intersects p−2L + 1 in correspondence to a larger
pL. However, if, on the one hand, under discretion the implementation cost
increases, on the other one the stock of migrants settled in D at the end of
the period may be higher as well as lower, according to the elasticity of the
critical preference for domestic consumption αM with respect to the optimal
policy pL, as it is possible to verify by a direct inspection of (10). If such an
elasticity is rather low, one should expect a lower stock of migrants settled in
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the destination country at the end of the period within the discretionary regime
than the corresponding stock obtained under the hypothesis that government
follows rules. If the number of migrants within the discretionary regime is lower
than the number obtained under “rules”, this will be more than counterbalanced
by a higher implementation cost: it follows that the “rules” regime dominates
the “discretionary” one in terms of aggregate welfare. As a matter of fact, when
government is bound to follow rules, one observes a lower expected loss for the
natives in D and a larger probability for the candidate migrants of returning
successfully to D, in the case they attempt to do that. It follows that everybody
will better off.
2.7 Migration Dynamics
Since we have assumed that government is short-sighted, in each period it will
choose an optimal state-dependent immigration policy regardless of its effects on
the total mass of immigrants settled in the destination country in the following
periods. This implies that the number of migrants settled in the destination
country at the end of each period will follow a stochastic pattern in response to
the realization of the shock and to the nature of the implemented policy, which
can follow rules or be discretionary. To appraise the dynamic behavior of the
stock of migrants settled in D, let us assume that the population is constant,
that agents are infinite lived and that, at the beginning of each period, each
migrant is settled in the same country where he was located at the end of the
previous one. Let, in addition, N0 and f0 be, respectively, the stock of the
candidate migrants settled in the origin country and the density function of the
stock of migrants living in the destination country at the beginning of period
zero. Eventually let us denote with Nt and ft, respectively, the stock of the
candidate migrants settled in the origin country and the density function of
the migrants settled in D at the beginning of period t. The number of migrants
settled in D at the end of period t+1 will be, within the regime i = R,D, where
R stands for “rules” and D for “discretion”, and setting piL the corresponding
migration policy (for sake of simplicity, we omit the time index)
Mt+1 =
αM(piL)∫
αmin
ft (α) dα
in the case of the realization of the good shock and
Mt+1 =
αM(piL)∫
αmin
ft (α) dα+ p
i
LNt + p
i
L
αmax∫
αM(piL)
ft (α) dα
in the case it is the adverse shock to occur. Notice, finally, that one has Nt =
αmax∫
αmin
f0 (α) dα+N0−
αmax∫
αmin
ft (α) dα and therefore the equilibrium dynamics within
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each regime follows a stochastic process depending upon the initial condition
(M0, N0) and upon the whole history of the realization of the shocks.
3 Electoral Accountability
In this section we analyze migration policy in a representative democracy and
focus whether electoral accountability may partly or wholly overcome the time
inconsistency problem. Our analysis is inspired on performance voting models
originally developed by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Aidt and Magris (2006)
and Magris and Russo (2015). The latter, in particular, focus on the time incon-
sistency problem arising in the context where government must chose to which
extent to grant amnesties to irregular workers. As a matter of fact, govern-
ment weights the fiscal gain deriving from the labor income tax of a legalized
migrant with the temptation of deporting him back to his home country. Ma-
gris and Russo (2015) characterize the set of immigration amnesty which can
be sustained at symmetric equilibrium and show that it can contain the first-
best under the hypothesis that politicians values political office enough. Within
this framework, voters can provide incentives to politicians by holding them ac-
countable at election times for past behavior and by threatening not to reelect
them if they deviate from a specified migration policy. This mechanism can be
viewed as complementary to the reputation one, but possesses the advantage
to do not depend upon the entirely history of policies and, as a consequence,
to do not require excessively large discount rates and an infinite time horizon.
The sustainability of the political equilibrium is based, indeed, on the ego rent
enjoyed by politicians in office and its dimension is crucial to provide a reliable
incentive to do not deviate from the announced policies and therefore to allow
the implementation of the first best, namely the rules outcome.
Following Magris and Russo (2015), we adopt Aidt and Magris (2006) logic
to our model, but depart from their stationary equilibrium framework resting
upon the hypothesis of an infinitely repeated game made possible by the time-
invariant structure of the model, in terms of number and of the type of the
players involved. In our case, on the contrary, the number of the immigrants
settled in the destination country and the number of the immigrants setlled
in the origin country evolve through time in response to previous migration
policies and new migration inflows and outflows make it impossible to focus on
stationary equilibria whose sustainability is based upon the reputation mech-
anism requiring an infinitely repeated game. We therefore consider a simple
two-period model where in the first period a politician takes office and voters
announce a performance standard indicating, for each migration policy imple-
mentation, whether or not the politician will get the vote of a native in the
election held at the end of the period. At the beginning of the second period,
however, the elected politician knows that he could not be reelected since the
game will not go on and thus he will always take advantage from a deviation:
the discretionary outcome in the second period is therefore bound to prevail.
In our model, those who vote and may punish politicians in case of their misbe-
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havior are uniquely the natives, meanwhile those who must anticipate correctly
the migration policy and decide whether or not to decide to leave the destina-
tion country are the immigrants, who by hypothesis do not vote. However, the
threat of punishment from the part of the natives to the misbehaving politicians
provides to the latter an incentive to not deviate and make the rules equilib-
rium credible to the immigrants too. The implementation of the threat is indeed
credible since it does not involve any cost and, provided politicians care about
holding office enough, the first best immigration policy will be supported by a
symmetric political equilibrium. Therefore, in spite of the discrepancy arising
between those who use the vote as a punishment device (the natives) and those
who must form anticipations about the migration policies (the immigrants), the
electoral accountability mechanism can be easily used to support a first best
(rules) outcome.
Consider now the first period. The politician in office must choose a migration
policy that minimizes the loss of the representative native of D. The discount
factor of the politician is the same as that of the households. In each period,
politicians enjoy the same (dis)utility of the households but also earn the ego
rent m from holding office. At the end of the first period elections take place:
by assuming that all households are eligible to vote in the elections, a challenger
selected from one of the natives runs against the incumbent politician. If the
latter loses office, in the second period he will return to the private sector and
the challenger will become the politician. In the second period the new politi-
cian will enjoy the ego rent m and at the end the game is over. To keep things
as simple as possible, we suppose a continuum of natives defined on the unit in-
terval, i.e. the set of natives is H = [0, 1]. Consider a voter j drawn from H. He
or she will set a performance standard at the beginning of the first period, once
the politician is already in office. Namely, each voter j ∈ H announces a vote
function λi(p
I) indicating, for each migration policy pI =
(
pIL, p
I
H
)
, whether
the politician will receive the vote of voter j in the election held at the end of
the period. λi(p
I) can be thus viewed as a simple probability for the politician
of getting the vote of individual j. We assume that the vote functions have the
following form:
λj(p
I) = 1 iff pI = psJ
λj(p
I) = 0 iff pI 6= psJ
where psj =
(
psj,L, p
s
j,H
)
is the performance standard announced by voter j ∈ H
at the beginning of period one. This means that politician in office will get
the vote of the voter j ∈ H if and only if the implemented migration policy is
equal to the performance standard. After the performance standard has been
announced, the politician implements a policy in the foregoing period, consist-
ing in a mapping from the set of performance standards onto [0, 1]2. He will be
re-elected if and only if at least half of the standards are satisfied. At the end
of the first period, natives cast their votes according to their vote functions and
the politician is reelected or not. In the latter case, in the second period, he will
return to the private sector and the new elected politician will hold the office
until the end of the period and implement a migration policy regardless to the
16
possibility of a reelection, in view of the finite time horizon of the model.
We define a political equilibrium a set of vote functions and policy implemen-
tation rules satisfying the following conditions: (i) given the vote functions, the
politician chooses the migration policy that maximizes his life-time utility; (ii)
the vote functions announced by each voter j ∈ H must maximize her life-time
utility taking as given the vote functions of the other natives and the policy im-
plementation rule of the politician. More in detail, we will focus on the special
case where all voters use the same vote function and will refer to it as symmetric
political equilibrium. In order to construct the political equilibrium, consider
the voters. Since it is impossible for the politician to give different treatment
to any subset of voters, at symmetric equilibrium one has ps = psj for all j ∈ H.
Notice, in addition, that any particular voter j cannot change the policy outcome
by deviating from the performance standard and thus has not (strict) incentive
to deviate. Consider now politician in office in the first period. His payoff can
be written as
V = m+G1(p
I , ps) + βλ(pI)V E + β
(
1− λ(pI))V NE (18)
where β is the discount factor, G1(p
I , ps) is the loss of an implemented migra-
tion policy pI in the first period given the standard performance (and therefore
the immigrants expectation) ps, V E the continuation value of the politician if
he is reelected at the end of the first period and V NE the continuation of his
utility if he is not reelected and returns to the private sector. Notice that in
the second period, whoever the politician in office is, the unique policy outcome
will be the discretionary one, since no elections at the end of the period are held
and therefore no vote functions are shaped. It follows that the payoff will cor-
respond to the discretionary equilibrium, i.e. G2(p
dis,k, pdis,k) where dis stands
for discretionary, G2 refers to the private utility in period two and k = s, dev
stands for the type of policy implemented in period one, which consists either in
complying the standard performance (k = s) or in deviating (k = dev). Notice,
indeed, that G2(p
dis,k, pdis,k) depends upon the mass of immigrants settled in
the destination country and in the origin country in period two which in turn
depend upon the type of policy implemented in the first period. Suppose the
politician does not want to be reelected. He will deviate and the best deviation
will be pdev 6= ps where dev stands for ”deviation”. As a matter of fact, if the
politician is willing to deviate, he will choose a more or less restrictive migra-
tion policy than the one immigrants are expecting, and his life-time utility will
therefore be
V NE = G1(p
dev, ps) +m+ βG2
(
pdis,dev, pdis,s
)
Suppose the politician wants to be reelected. Then the best implementation
policy is pI = pS and the associated payoff is
V E = G1(p
s, ps) +m+ β
[
m+G2
(
pdev,s, ps
)]
Assuming that politician complies if indifferent and voters behave according to
their vote functions, since this does not entail any cost, a necessary and sufficient
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condition for compliance is V E > V NE i.e.
m >
1
β
([
G1(p
dev, ps)−G1(ps, ps)
]
+ β
[
G2(p
dev,dis, pdev,dis −G2(pdev,s, pdev,s
])
(19)
It follows that ps can be supported as outcome of a symmetric political
equilibrium under the domain of inequality (19). In particular, the first best
immigration policy pR, where R stands for ”rules” can be supported as the out-
come of a symmetric political equilibrium if (19) holds once one has replaced ps
with pR . The rationale of the mechanism above described is the following. In
the first period the politician face the temptation to deviate and implement a
more restrictive migration policy, ensuring a payoff G1(p
dev, ps). The incumbent
politician balance such a temptation to deviate against the desire to be reelected
and earn the ego rent m. Voters therefore must coordinate on a symmetric per-
formance standard such that politician prefer to comply to secure election. If
the ego rent m is high enough, the policy under rules can be supported by a
symmetric political equilibrium. The mechanism based on the electoral account-
ability exploits the fact that politicians value political office, from which they
enjoy the ego rent. Voters know that and, accordingly, can punish politicians by
replacing them with a challenger. The political equilibrium therefore does not
require an infinitely repeated game and a large enough discount factor, as it is
the case within the reputation mechanism consisting in threatening politicians
by revoking them the trust. As pointed out by Aidt and Magris (2006) and Ma-
gris and Russo (2015), performance voting requires that voters can coordinate
their voting strategies. More specifically, by allowing individuals to set their
own standard performance in a non-cooperative manner, this opens the door
for a very large set of equilibria, some dominating others. This, in turn, would
require to shape some theory of equilibrium selection or to employ some more
demanding equilibrium concepts. However, we are able to characterize the set
of outcomes that can be sustained by the mechanism of the electoral account-
ability and to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to the inclusion in this
set of the first best, namely the equilibrium emerging under rules. In addition,
in our model we assume that politicians are perfect substitutes for each other
and therefore voters are indifferent between any two candidates at the election
and thus they have no strict incentive to deviate from their announced voting
strategy. Were politicians different, each with his own desirable characteristics,
the accountability problem would become more complicate and would require
to take into account more cumbersome voting strategies, as suggested, e.g., by
Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have derived the optimal migration policy under the hypothe-
sis that opening the borders influences not only the migration entry flows, but
the exit ones too. We have shown that a more permissive policy increases both
flows and that, at the end, the stock of immigrants settled in the destination
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country will be lower than in the case one would have considered solely the
entry flows. We have shown that in this context, there could arise a problem in
terms of commitment concerning the implementation of the migration policy.In
particular we have found that under discretion, border controls are stricter than
the case where government follows rules. Since observed migration policy are
rather laxist, this suggest the existence of an appropriated commitment technol-
ogy. We identify such technology in the electoral accountability: if politicians
value office enough, under the threat of not being reelected, they resist to the
temptation of deviating from the announced policy. We have also shown that a
more stable origin country may alleviate the migration pressure and allows for
a Pareto improvement. These results suggest the opportunity of policies aimed,
by means of aid programs and economic partnerships, at stabilizing the origin
countries by minimizing the frequencies at which negative shocks occur, with
the result of increasing the average labor productivity in the source countries.
The choice of the immigrants whether to return home depends upon the
incentives they are faced with, and it is positively related with the probabil-
ity of a successful re-emigration should in the origin country occur a negative
shock, and with the preference for domestic consumption. Such a parameter
can be viewed as the measure of the “distance” (geographical, cultural, politi-
cal, social, environmental) between the two countries. The migration policy we
have described appears therefore to be “selective” since the immigrants who are
more likely to remain in the destination country are those who exhibit a larger
cultural proximity with the latter.
It would be interesting, following Dustmann (2003, 2007), to consider a pro-
cess of wealth accumulation (for example physical capital) in the destination
country. The immigrant will indeed use his wealth to finance consumption in
the origin country, should he return there, but, in view of the postulated insta-
bility of the country, the return of this wealth will be risky and the measure
of the risk will in turn influence the choice of return home. Eventually, one
could easily extend the model by assuming that the migrants living initially
in the destination country face a different migration policy than that faced by
the migrants settled initially in the origin country. In such a case, one should
expect a more permissive policy for the migrants living initially in the destina-
tion country in view of the migration outflow mechanism, taking obviously into
account also the relative stock of migrants in D to O.
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